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Le Modèle de Gravité est utilisé avec succès dans les études 
empiriques sur les flous de commerce international entre les 
pays. Le présent travail, d'après McCallum (1995), Helliwel 
(1995), Wei (1996), Nitsch (2000), parmi autres, cherche à 
appliquer le Modèle de Gravité à un échantillon de 22 pays, y 
comprises les pays de l'Amérique du Sud et les principaux 
partenaires commerciaux des pays membres du Mercosur, pour 
établir s'il existe une préférence révélé pour les biens produits 
chez eux en comparaison avec des biens étrangers. Les résultats 
montrent qui le degré de ce home bias dans le marché des biens 
est considérable pour les pays dans l'échantillon, quoique 
décroissante sur la période 199 1 - 1997. Pour le Mercosur, 
considéré comtne un seul marché domestique, l'évidence suggère 
que le degré de home bias est bas, alors que croissante, relative à 
la moyenne des pays dans l'échantillon. Cette tendance 
croissante du degré de home bias du Mercosur est interprétée 
comme un signal que la création du bloc a été effective dans la 
promotion de l'intégration économique entre les pays du 
Mercosur. Toutes ces conclusions sont, en gros, robustes aux 
changements dans la spécification du modèle, dans la méthode 
d'estimation etlou dans la façon de mesurer les variables 
utilisées. Finalement, si nous interprétons le degré de home bias 
comme un index d'ouverture au commence international' le 
présent travail offre de l'évidence que les pays plus développés 
sont plus ouverts au commerce international que les moins 
développés. 
Mots Clés : Modèle de Gravité, commerce internationale, 
Mercosur. 
ABSTRACT 
The so-called Gravity Model has been successfblly used in 
empirical studies of trade flows between countries. In this paper, 
following McCallum (1995), Helliwel (1995), Wei (1996), 
Nitsch (2000), among others, we apply the Gravity Model to a 
sample of 22 countries, including South-American countries and 
the main trade partners of the Mercosur country-members, in 
order to infer if there is, among these countries, a manifested 
preference for the domestic-produced goods in comparison to 
foreign-produoed goods. The results indicate that the degree of 
this "home bias" in the goods markets is substantial among the 
countries included in the sample, although decreasing over the 
period 1991-1997. For the Mercosur Bloc, treated as a single 
market, the evidence suggests a low, but consistently increasing 
over time, degree of home bias in comparison with the average 
home bias for the countries in the sample. This upward trend in 
Mercosur's home bias is interpreted as a sign of effectiveness of 
the bloc in promoting the integration between the Mercosur 
national economies. These general conclusions are roughly 
robust to changes in mode1 specification, estimation method 
and/or in the measurement of the variables used. Finally, if one 
interprets the degree of home bias as an index of openness to the 
international trade, this study have provided some evidence that 
the developed countries are more open to trade than the 
developing countries. 
Key Words: Gravity Model, home bias, international trade, 
Mercosur 
L CONTENTS 
1 . 
II . 
III . 
IV . 
v . 
VI . 
VI1 . 
VI11 . 
IX . 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 0 1 
RELATED LITERATURE ................................................ 03 
THE GRAVITY MODEL .................................................. 07 
DATA ......................................................................... 10 
RESULTS ..................................................................... 15 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ................................................ -29 
. VI 1 . Collinearity Problems ............................. 29 
VI.2. Nitsch' s Definition of Remoteness .............. 34 
VI.2. Endogeneity Problem ............................. 39 
HOME BIAS AS AN OPENNESS INDEX ............................... 42 
CONCLUSION .............................................................. 46 
REFERENCES ............................................................... 48 
L LIST OF TABLE$ 
Table 1 : Shipment-to-Value Added Ratio .......................................... 13 
Table 2: Shipment-to-Value Added Ratio Estimated ............................. 14 
Table 3 : Home Bias, 199 1 - 1997 ...................................................... 19 
Table 4 : Evolution of the Home Bias, 199 1 - 1 997 .................................. 21 
Table 5: Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias, 199 1-1 997 ........................... 23 
Table 6: Evolution of the Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias, 199 1 - 1997 ....... 25 
Table 7 : Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias II, 199 1 - 1 997 ........................ 31 
Table 8: Home Bias II, 199 1-1 997 ................................................... 35 
Table 9: Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias III, 1991 -1997 ........................ 37 
Table 10: Home Bias III, 199 1-1 997 .................................................. 40 
Table 1 1 : Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias IV, 199 1 - 1997 ...................... 41 
Table 12: Country-Sp~cific Average Home Bias , 199 1 - 1997 .................. 43 
IN THE APPENDIX: 
Table A: Evolution of the Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias II. 199 1 . 1997 
Table B : Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias V. 199 1-1997 
Table C: Evolution of the Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias III. 1991 -1997 
L LIST OF GRAPHS 
Figure 1 : Evolution of the Home Bias. 199 1 . 1997 ................................... 22 
Figure 2: Mercosur: Home Bias Evolution. 199 1 . 1997 ............................. 26 
Figure 3 : Intra-Mercow Members: Home Bias Evolution. 1 99 1 . 1997 ........... 27 
Figure 4: Non-Mercosur Members: Home Bias Evolution, 199 1 . 1997 ............ 27 
Figure 5: Mercosur: Home Bias Evolution II. 1991 .1997 ........................... 32 
........ Figure 6: Intra-Mercosur Members: Home Bias Evolution II. 199 1 . 1997 33 
Figure 7: Evolution of the Home Bias II, 199 1 . 1997 ................................ 36 
Figure 8: Mercosur: Home Bias Evolution III, 199 1.1997 .......................... 38 
....... Figure 9: Intra-Mercosur Members: Home Bias Evolution III, 199 1 - 1 997 38 
. ..................... Figure 10: Country-Specific Average Home Bias, 199 1 1997 44 
1. Introduction 
In the post-World War II period a general amplification and intensification on the 
international relations has been observed, including both capital and trade flows. Despite 
this ongoing liberalization process, it is a relatively well-known fact that domestic agents, 
resident-based in a particular national economy, al1 other things equal, tend to prefer 
buying assets in their own (domestic) capital markets. This lack of international portfolio 
diversification phenomena, or a country "home bias"' in the assets markets, is discussed 
in French and Poterba (1 991), Tesar and Werner (1992), Tesar and Werner (1 999, Lewis 
(1996), arnong others. For an overview, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998). 
A recent research agenda tries to identifi and measure the existence of a similar 
home bias on the merchandise trade. We define "home bias'' in the context of 
merchandise trade as the manifested preference of the residents within a country for 
national goods, relatively to foreign goods. 
The question is whether there is, or there is not, any evidence showing that 
residents in a given country tend to trade more among themselves in comparison to 
foreign partners; that is, if they prefer domestic-made over foreign produced goods, 
ceteris paribus. McCallum (1995), using data fiom Canada and the U.S. for 1988, shows 
that Canada's provinces tend to trade about twenty times more with each other than they 
trade with U.S.'s States. These results were confirmed, using Canada-US data for 1993, 
by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), who showed that the inter-province trade is 16.4 
times greater than the state-province trade and that the inter-state trade is 1.50 times 
higher than the state-province trade. Anderson and Van Wincoop7s findings suggest that 
the home bias observed in the U.S. is much lower than Canada's. Their results also 
suggest that Canada's home bias has decreased over the 1988-93 period. 
Wei (1996) and Nitsch (2000) presented similar studies for OECD and European 
countries, respectively. Wei (1996) found and measured the degree of the home bias 
existent in the trade among OECD countries for the years 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1994. He 
also measured it for the European Community and in the European Free Trade Area. 
L Nitsch (2000) pointed out that Wei's results might not be representative for the European 
Union because not al1 the country-members were included in order to measure the home 
bias of the bloc. Then, using data fkom selected years in the 1979-1990 period, he found 
that the home bias in the European Union was substantially larger than Wei's estimates 
and considerably lower than the one implied by McCallum (1995) for Canada. 
As far as 1 know, there is no such investigation applied to the country-members of the 
Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur). To fil1 this gap, this paper will try to 
measure the existence, and if any, the degree of "home bias" on the merchandise trade 
among Mercosur country-members (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) and both 
some (selected) of their main trade partners and the remaining South-American countries. 
Given the possible implications of the results that could emerge fkom this kind of study, 
we will use the same methodology proposed by the literature mentioned above in order to 
measure the degree of home bias on Mercosur as a trade bloc and analyze its behavior 
over the period 1991- 1997. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II shows a brief review of the related 
literature. Then, in the Section III, we present the "Gravity Model" which is the 
theoretical approach most commonly used in this literature. The data used in the 
empirical work is discussed in Section IV. Section V provides the results, including some 
robustness checks, and the last section concludes. 
II. Related Literatpre 
The seminal work, which would provide the theoretical background to the model we will 
use in this paper, is a book by Linnemann (1966). In his book, in order to try explaining 
the trade flow between tut0 countries, he presented what is known today as the "Gravity 
Model", using a terminology borrowed from physics. Although this model was criticized 
for its lack of microfoundations, it was empirically usehl to explain the trade flow.' In 
the words of Deardorff(l984, p.503): 
"In spite of their somewhat dubious theoretical heritage, gravity models 
have been extremely successfùl empirically". 
According to this wodel, the trade flow between two countries should depend on 
their potential demand and supply, represented by both countries' Gross Domestic 
Products (GDP) and on some "resistance factor", represented by the distance between 
them. More specifically, the model predicts that, ceteris paribus, the trade flow should 
correlate positively to both GDP's and negatively to the distance between the two 
countries. 
Anderson (1979) provided a theoretical explanation for the Gravity Model 
exploring the properties of an expenditure system in a model displaying homothetic 
preferences (Cobb-Douglbs and Constant Elasticity of Substitution) across different 
regions or countries and country-specialization in the production of one good. Deardorff 
(1995), followiog the steps of Anderson (1979), have demonstrate that the Gravity Model 
could be obtained from the Hecksher-Ohlin Model. One of his results was to show that 
bilateral trade is not only fùnction of the direct distance between two countries but it also 
depends on the relative (to other trade partner countries) distance of the countries or 
remoteness, as we shall see later. 
1 Actuaily, Linneman (1966) tried to provide some theoretical foundation to this model by using 
Walras' equilibrium. We wiil discuss it in more detail in the next section. 
With the ongoing liberalization process across countries, one could think that the 
L borders have not more significant influence on trade flows. To access this proposition, 
about the importance of the national borders for trade flows, a recent research agenda has 
emerged whose literature has been used different versions of the Gravity Model. 
McCallum (1995) used a version of the Gravity Model to study the impact of the border 
on the trade between Canada and the U.S. Although these two economies are very similar 
on size, culture, language etc, and despite intensification of trade flows, he showed that, 
ceteris paribus, the bordier has an important effect on the trade between these two 
countries. He used data for al1 Canadian provinces and thirty American states for the year 
1988 (when the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area was signed) and concluded that the 
Canadian provinces trade 22 times more among them than they trade with the American 
states, after controlling for economy size and distance. 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) have also used the Gravity Model to study the 
effect of the border on the trade between Canada and the U.S. With respect to 
McCallum's (1995) worlt, their model presents some additional features. First, they 
included both the trade anlong the U.S.'s states and the trade between each state and each 
Canadian province, while McCallum only used data on the trade among Canadian 
provinces and on the province-state trade. Second, they also provide a different 
theoretical foundation to the Gravity Model. Their contribution to the model is the 
inclusion of the average barrier among the trade between two countries or, as they called, 
a "multilateral resistance". This new variable is different from the remoteness variable 
introduced by in Deardofl(1995) in the sense that "remoteness index does not capture 
any of the other trade b d e r s . .  . [than the relative distance between countries, a proxy for 
the transportation costs-J'. 
When they used the same model, with the same set of variables, the empirical 
results of Anderson and Van Wincoop's study were slightly different fiom McCallum's. 
Their findings, from data for the year 1993, show that the Canadian provinces trade 16.4 
2 
LJ See Anderson and Wpncoop (2003, p.170). Despite the fact that it does not capture any other "resistance factor" than the relative distance between countries, the remoteness variable will stiii be used in this paper. In a future work, we intend to W u c e  the multilateral resistance. 
times more (22 times, according to McCallum, for 1988) with themselves than with a 
L U.S. state, after controlling for size and distance. Since the data set on this work 
corresponds to the year 1993 while McCallum (1995) used data for the year 1988, and 
given the same methodology, one could conclude that from 1988 to 1993 the borders 
effect on the trade flows fiom Canada to the U.S. has been diminishing. On the other 
hand, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) found a much smaller home bias coefficient for 
the U.S. if compared with the Canadian coefficient. According to the results, the trade 
among the Americans states is 1.50 times bigger than the trade among the states and a 
Canadian province, other things equal. None conclusion can be drawn about what 
happened to the border's effect on the trade flows fiom the U.S. to Canada since 
McCallum7s work does not provide a basis for comparison. 3 
An empirical application of Deardorf's (1995) theoretical foundation for the 
Gravity Mode1 is due to Wei (1996). In his paper, He uses a standard version of the 
model to measure the exigtence of the home bias among OECD countries for the years 
1982, 1986, 1990 and 1994. He confirmed the existence of home bias for these countries, 
with a coefficient that suggests that the trade within an OECD country-member is 9.7 
times higher than its trade with another country, after controlling for size and distance. 
He also uses an "expandeci" model, which includes the measure for remoteness (relative 
distance, the average distance of a country and the other countries in the sample) and 
dummy variables for those countries that speak the same language and for countries that 
share a common border. With these modifications, he verified a smaller degree (2.6 
instead of 9.7) of home bias for the OECD countries over the period. 
Wei (1996) was also interested in measuring the degree of home bias for the two 
trade blocs included in the sample: the European Community (EC) and the European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA). As a bloc, he found the EC's home bias, although constantly 
increasing over the period 1982-1994, to be extremely low in comparison to that found 
3 However, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) argue that McCailum's method produces biased 
results (too high) because ". . .dis estimate is based on a regression with ornitted variables, the multilateral 
L resistance terms." When they e$timated the model includmg the muitilateral resistance t e m  they found the Canadian border's effect on the trade flow to be only 10.7 instead of the 16.4 obtained when using the McCallum approach. 
for the OECD's average. As for the European Community's country-members, Wei 
LJ (1996) found that they also "exhibit some degree of home bias, although much smaller 
than the OECD average",4 but contrarily to what happens to the trade bloc as a whole, the 
home bias of the EC counm-members have decreased during the same period. 
The results concerning to the European Free Trade Area also show a low degree of home 
bias both for the EFTA trade bloc as a whole and for its country-members. 
With the same methodology from Wei (1996)' Nitsch (2000) also measured the 
home bias for the EC countries. The main differences between the two studies are the 
samples used (while Nitsch's sample includes al1 European Union country-members over 
the time 1979- 1990, "Wei's OECD sample does not include BelgiurnlLuxembourg, 
Greece and ~reland")' and the method used to measure the distance and the average 
distance between a country and the rest of the countries in the ~ a m ~ l e . ~  
Nitsch's results irnply a larger home bias for the EC than that found by Wei 
(1996). On average, accotding to Nitsch's results, any country-member of the European 
Community trades 8.17 times more "with itself' than they trade with another country in 
the EC, after controlling for country sizes and distance, comparing to 4.71 times, 
according to Wei's results. However, the results are robust to that found by Wei (1996) 
when he examines the evollution of the home bias over time, confirming the decline of the 
home bias among the European Union country-members. 
On the present study, we will follow the same approach of Wei (1996)' based on 
the Gravity Model, to measure the home bias on the Mercosur bloc. Therefore, a more 
detailed presentation of the mode1 is necessary. That is the subject of the next section. 
4 See Wei (1996), p. 15. 
5 See Nitsch (2000), p. 1092. 
6 
1 As we shail see on Section V, Nitsch (2000) noted that the Wei's measure of remoteness (average 
relative distance between two countries) is "incons&nt with the theoreticai requirements of the gav& 
approach". 
III. The Gravity Model 
As pointed out in the previous section, the original Gravity Model (GM) has been 
successfully used in empirical studies to explain trade flows between a pair of countries. 
The first version of the GM, due to Linneman (1966), emphasized three factors that 
should influence the trade flows between the countries: the potential supply of the 
exporting country, the potential demand of the importing country and the factor 
"resistance". Using a Quasi-Walrasian model to link the trade flow equation to the 
Economic Theory, Linneman (1966, p. 42) proposed an equation of the type: 
where a,P,G and y are constants; X, is the value of the trade flow between the 
exporter (country i) and the importing country (indexed by j); For the exporting and 
importing countries, respectively, W ,  and Wl are functions of country's GDP and its 
population size; is its corresponding similar for the importing country. It should be 
noticed that the variables W, and W ,  try to capture Linneman's "potential supply and 
demand", not a complete measure. The variable t ,  represents the "resistance factors" 
that influence the trade floiw.' 
Although Linneman's model was criticized in its theoretical foundations, the basic 
elements were already there. Subsequent studies improved considerably in providing 
better microeconomic foundation to the Gravity Model. We are not going to provide the 
foundations to the empiriqal model we use, for it is beyond the scope of this paper. For 
the purpose of this work, tihat of measuring the degree of home bias on Mercosur bloc and 
7 The resistance factors can be classified as natural and artincial. Examples of natural resisîance 
factors are the cost and time of transportation. Artinciai factors would be mainly tariffs, quotes and other 
institutionai barriers to trade. Since cost and time of transportation are related to the distance between two 
countries, Linneman proposed to use only a simple measure of distance as a proxy variable for natural 
resistance factors. In addition, because of the diflïcuit of measurement, he did not use the artificial 
resistance factors on his empirical work. 
on its country-members, we will rely on Wei's (1996) work and refer the reader to his 
L theoretical formulation, wluch produces the equations used here. Alternative theoretical 
approaches are Anderson (1979), Deardorff (1995), and Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003). 
The "home bias" in the context of merchandise trade, that is the revealed relative 
preference of a country's residents for national goods, in comparison to foreign goods, 
has been documented to exist despite trade liberalization reforms and formation of trade 
blocs. We will try to find Ohe same kind of evidence for the Mercosur countries, following 
the literature that uses a dummy variable (here, called Home) on the standard Gravity 
Model. The basic version of the GM used here is given by equation (1): 
where: xv is the exports of country i to country j ;  Home, is a hmmy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if i = j (the country "trades with itself '), and 0, otherwise; and Y, are the 
gross domestic products (GDP) of corntries i (the exporter) and j (the importer), 
respectively; D, is the distance between country i and j; and, an error term. The 
rationalization of the empirical mode1 given by equation (l), in terms of a utility- 
maximizing frame work, which is beyond the scope of this paper, can be found in Wei 
(1996). 
Other variables can be introduced on equation (1). For exarnple, another dummy 
for language (1 if both aountries i and j speak the same language and 0, othenvise). 
Another possible extension is the inclusion of a measure of the remoteness of a country. 
This variable should capture the idea that not only a smaller absolute distance is 
important to ease the trade between to countries. The fact that a country has few or many 
neighbors could be important as well; for example, every other things being equal, 
Australia and New Zealand, good examples of "remotey' countries, may trade more with 
L each other than two other countries separated by the same distance. Wei (1996) and 
Nitsch (2000) use the extended version of equation (1). Here, we will make these 
C/ extensions as well (see Section V). 
In the equation (11, the coefficientsp, , and p, show the elasticity of exports 
of country i to country j with respect toY, , Y, andD,, respectively. The home bias is 
measured by the coefficient y on the dummy variable Home. Notice that 
a h  x, ,@Home, = y .  Thus, an increase of one unit in Home such as the caused by 
changing from an inter-national (Home = O) to a intra-national trade (Home = 1) implies a 
change of y units in In x,, or, that x, lx, = ey , i t j . That is, the coefficient on the 
Home variable indicates that a given country i exports eY times more to itself than to a 
foreign country j,  ceteris paribus. In this sense, if eY > 1, we can conclude that there is 
"home bias" on the merchandise trade for the sample of countries in study and a typical 
country in the sample has 8 preference for their own product vis-à-vis foreign goods. 
In section V, we flirther discuss the estimation of equation (1) and its extensions. 
We also present the estimation of the parameter y as well the evolution of the degree of 
home bias, eY,  for a groiip of countries that include the Mercosur members, their main 
1 
trade partners and the reqaining South-American countries. First, in the next section, we 
provide some pertinent infiormation about the data set used on this study. 
IV. Data 
For the purpose of this study we need cross-country data on the GDP, the direction of the 
exports or bilateral trade (that is, the exports fiom a country to another, including the 
"exports of a country to itself', to be defined later) and the distance between al1 possible 
pairs of countries in the sample. GDP and the bilateral trade between two different 
countries came fiom the World Development Indicators and fiom the MF's Direction of 
Trade, respectively. To get the "exports of a country to itself' we used a methodology 
suggested by Wei (1996). In order to ampute the distances between two countries we 
used the program availdble in http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java~lat-long.htm. 
Both approaches, to ampute the intra-national trade and the distance, will be described 
in the next paragraphs. 
The criteria for the selection of the countries and for the time-period to include in 
the sample were the following. First, because of geographical and economical 
similarities, we considered al1 South-Arnerican countries including, of course, the four 
Mercosur members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). The exceptions are 
Guyana and Suriname, which are more closely related to the Caribbean countries than to 
South Arnerica. Availability of data on bilateral exports constrained our sample to the 
time period 1991-1997. 
Second, based on the US$ level of exports, for each year fiom 1991 to 1997, and 
for each of the Mercosur country-members, we selected the 10 countries that were the 
main destination of their exPorts.* Whenever the data for a selected country was not 
available, we replaced it for the eleventh, twelfth etc. country on the ranking of main 
importers.g 
8 Of cowse. it could be possible that a previousiy selected South-Amencan country was among the 
10 main trade partners of a @en Mercosur country-member. When this occurred we did not choose 
another country (the 1 lth main importer, for instance) to replace it. 
9 This was the case for Bermuda, Taiwan and Switzerland, which were among the main buyers of 
Paraguay's exports, and for Israel, which was in the top 10 list of importers h m  Uruguay. 
As usual in this litqrature, in order to measure the distance between two countries, 
L we adopted the "greater circle distance" criterion, whereby the distance between two 
countries is equal to the surface distance (based on the latitudes and longitudes). As a 
reference for each country' we used their capital cities, with the exceptions of Brazil and 
the U.S. for wich the seleeed cities were Siio Paulo and Chicago, respectively. Within a 
country, that is the "distance between a country and itself', or the intra-national distance, 
we also followed Wei (1996) in using a quarter of the distance between the country (its 
capital) and it nearest neigbbor on the sampleiO. 
Now, we discuss the concept of a country's "trade with itself'. One problem is 
that data for the trade volume within countries are not available. Wei (1996) overcame 
this issue by creating a method that has been used in the literature [for example, Nitsch 
(2000)l. Here, we are goiog to follow the same approach. Wei's method is based on the 
assumption that what a country "exports to itself" is the total domestic production minus 
the total exports to foreign countries. However, it should be noted that the measure of a 
country's "exports to itself' is not simply the GDP minus the total exports. Two main 
adjustments are necessary. 
First, since the data set on bilateral trade usually includes only the exports of 
goods (not services) and the GDP involves both the production of goods and services 
(including the transport saor) ,  one must exclude the services and transport sector share 
of the GDP. The data on services (including transport) used in this paper also come f?om 
the World Development Ikcdicators. Wei defines this new variable as the "goods part of 
GDP, or GGDP: 
GGDP = GDP - services - transport 
Another adjustment is needed to take into account that the value of the exports in 
the data set of bilateral trade is usually measured in terms of "shipment value" (that is, it 
10 Exception were to Japan, China and Iran for which we measure the intra-national distance as the 
half of the average distance m n g  the North, South, East and West borden. 
includes the value of al1 the intermediary transactions, not only the value added or the 
C/ final demand) while GDP is computed in value added terms. To get the shipment 
counterpart of GGDP, Wei multiplied the GGDP for the shipment-to-value added ratio: 
shiprt.ic.itf 
GGDPshtpment = ( adej) * GGDpvalue added 
Once the value of the GGDP adjusted in "shipment-value" is computed, in order 
to compute a country's "exports to itself', one has to exclude the total exports to the rest 
of the world fiom the GGDP: 
x,= GGDP,ipm,n, - total exports of country i 
In this paper, we faced an additional restriction. For Our country sample we did 
not have access to the shipment-to-value added ratio for al1 countries" and also for al1 
periods. The shipment-to value added ratio is computed fiom the ratio between the gross 
value of total production (including intermediary production, that is, the "shipment 
value") to the production in terms of value added. 
At the Table 1 below, with the exception of the values marked with an (*) or (**), 
al1 the information was computed using data directly collected fiom different sources. For 
the ten OECD countries (Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom and the U.S.) the information came fi-om the 
OECD's Industrial Structure Statistics. For Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Venezuela we used data fi-om their respective Central banks. For Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil and Colombia we used data their respective national statistics institutes.12 
11 That is the case of Iran, China and Peru. 
l2 Argentina: Instituîo Nacionai de Estadistica y Censos; Bolivia: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica; 
Brazil: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica; Colombia: Departamento Administrative Nacional de 
Estadistica. 
For the missing data in the middle of a time sample for a given country (see the 
L values marked with an (*3,  for Argentina in 1994-1996 and Italy in 1995), we used the 
available data points to construct linear interpolated values. Then, we computed the 
average growth rate between the first and the last available data point to construct linear 
extrapolated values, marked with an (**). 
Table 1 
Shipment-to-Value Added Ratio 
Argent ina 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
Paraguay 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Uruguay 
United States 
(*) Linear interpolation; 
(* *) Linear extrapolation. 
For the three countries for which we did not find the shipment-to-value added 
ratio data set (Iran, China and Peru) we used an econometric strategy. In order to get 
estimates of the shipment-to-value ratio for those countries, we assumed that the 
shipment-to value added ratio is linearly related to the proportion of exports to the GDP. 
L We propose the following cross-section regression model: 
We used applied tbis regression equation to the data of Table 1. Then, we used the 
information of the exportdGDP for the three countries in order to get their (estimated) 
shipment-to value ratios. Table 2 displays the results of the estimation based on this 
method. 
Table 2 
Shipment-to-Value Added Ratio Estimated 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
China 2,43 2,45 2,46 2,46 2,46 2,44 2,46 
Iran 2,44 2,56 2,62 2,57 2,46 2,48 2,53 
Peru 2,3 5 2,30 2,28 2,30 2,32 2,33 
Note: Data based on the estimation. 
Now, in the next section, we discuss the estimation of the equation (1) and its 
extensions. 
V. Results 
As showed in Section III, the framework used to measure the home bias is the Gravity 
Model equation, complemented with the Home dummy variable. We re-write the standard 
equation of the simplest Gravity Model, used by McCallum (1995) and Helliwell(1996): 
However, followidg Wei (1996), we will extend the mode1 to acwunt for the 
relative distance between a country and the others countries in the sample (the remoteness 
variable) and to control for the effects of the languages spoken and the common borders 
(the Language and Adjacmcy dummy variables, respectively). The empirical equation 
becomes: 
In the equation (2), above, In(R,) and ln(&) are the measures of (the natural log of) 
remoteness for the exparter and the importing country, respectively. The dummy 
variables for the language and for the common border are defined as follows: Lunguage, 
= 1, if countries i and j speak the same language, and zero, otherwise; and Adjacency, = 
1, if countries i and j share a common border, and zero, otherwise. 
We included the sçibscript t in the equation (2) in order to represent it, following 
Wei (1 996) and Nitsch (2000), as a system of seven (one for each year of the 199 1 - 1997 
period) cross-section equqtions. Also following the literature, we allow for year-specific 
intercepts, but the remai&g coefficients are fixed for al1 years. Because some of the 
observations, for some cauntries, on export direction (bilateral trade, x,J were reported 
by the IMF's Direction of Trade yearbook as (. . .), indicating that a value is not available, 
insignificant or zero, we worked with an unbalanced sample. That is, depending on the 
missing values, we excluded the corresponding observations in a way that the number of 
C/ observations in each crosd-section equation was not necessarily the sarne. For robustness, 
we also made al1 the estimations considering a balanced sample, by taking the 
L observations reported as (...) to be equal to zero. Since the results were virtually the 
same, we will only report those of the unbalanced ~ a m ~ l e . ' ~  
Three estimation rnethods were used: 1) a simple cross-section or Pooled Least 
Squares, in which the errar terms are not contemporaneously nor inter-period correlated; 
2) a Generalized Least Squares (GLS), in which the errors are not contemporaneously 
correlated but may covariate across equations; and 3) a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) mode1 that allows for contemporaneous and cross-equation correlations. In 
general, the results were robust to these variations. 
First, we consider the existence of home bias in the specific countries of the 
sample. We consider a version of the equations (1) and (2) in which the dummy variable 
Home, takes the value of 1 whenever i = j and zero othenvise, where i is the exporting 
country and j, the importer. In this version, the factor eY refers to the home bias observed 
for the whole group of countries included in Our sample. 
The results are reported on Table 3. For each of the three estimation methods, 
Table 3 displays three colwmns. Columns 2, 4 and 6 display the results for the estimation 
of the simplest Gravity Model (we cal1 it, Model l), used by McCallum (1995) and 
Helliwell (1996), given by equation (1). The columns 3, 5 and 7 show the estimation of 
the Model 2, represented by the equation (2), which is the equation (1) extended with a 
measure of (the log of) remoteness and the dumrny variables Language and Adjacency. 
In this section, the remoteness variable is measured following Wei (1996), as the 
average, weighted by the .share of a country's GDP in the total GDP of the sample, of the 
distance between a country and the rest of the other countries in the sample: 
13 We aiso estimated the models for the whole sample and for the sample excludinfs the three 
countries Iran, China and Peru which ones we does not have ail data set. The results, not reported, were 
robust. 
where Ry is Wei's measure of the remoteness of a country i, w h  is the country h's 
L share on the sample total GDP and D ,  is the distance between countries h and i.14 Later, 
in Section V.3.1, we will re-estimate the model using R, = RN,, the measure proposed by 
Nitsch (2000). 
We summarize the estimated models: 
Model 2 (GM including remofeness, language and cornmon border, equation 2): 
We are primarily interested in the estimation of the parameter y ,  which gives the 
degree of home bias, eY . When y > O, we conclude that there exists home bias because 
the country is trading eY > 1 times more with it~elf than its trade with other countries in 
the sample. On the other hand, y 5 O implies that the country trades eY I l  times more 
with itself than it does witb other countries in the sample and no home bias is present. For 
15 al1 the remaining parameters, the P ' s  , we expected them be positive with the exception 
of P,, the coefficient of the "resistance factor", represented by the (natural log of) the 
distance between countries i and j, l n ( ~ # , ~ ) .  Of course, the higher is the absolute distance 
between two countries (a proxy for the transportation costs), the lower should be the trade 
flows. 
l4 Later, in Section V.3.1, we will re-estimate the model using R, = RN, , the measure proposed by 
Nitsch (2000). 
15 There is no "expected sign" for the year-specific intercepts a,. They are simply r d  numbers. 
The coefficients ,O, > O and P, > O represent the effects of the potential supply 
L and demand, given by the GDP's of the exporter and importer countries, respectively. 
The higher these effects are, the higher should be the exports fiom a country to another. 
Coefficients ,O, >O and ,O, > O  represent the remoteness effect. The more remote a 
country is (the higher is the average distance fiom it to the other countries in the sample, 
which should be thought as "third" country), the more likely it is to trade with any given 
country. Coefficients P6 > O and P, > O indicate that counties that speak the same 
language and share a common border should trade more with each other. 
Table 3 displays the results of the estimation of Models 1 and 2. Notice that al1 the 
variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant (at the 10% level, at 
least), regardless of the estimation method used, in the case of Model 1. For example, 
according to the column 6, corresponding to the SUR estimation method for Model 1, a 
one percent increase on the GDP of the importer's countries causes the exports to rise 
0.7484 percent. In addition, if the distance is one percent higher, the trade flows between 
a pair of countries is reduaed by 1.1 74 1 percent. 
In addition, still cansidering the Model 1, the estimated coeEcient of the dummy 
variable Home, y ,  was positive (2.9267, 2.9335 or 2.71 15, depending on the estimation 
method, columns 2, 4 or 6) and statistically significant. Since this is the coefficient of 
interest to evaluate the degree of home bias, the results indicate that there is a home bias 
in the trade of goods amoog the 22 countries in the sample, for the period of analysis. For 
the Model 1, let us consider the estimation based on the SUR method (which tends to be 
more efficient since we use more information about the error structure) at column 6. 
According to it, the degree of home bias, measured by the estimated er7 indicates that, on 
average, a country in the sample exports 15.05 (= exp [2.7115]) times more to itself than 
it does to a foreign country, afker controlling for size and distance. l6  
l 6  Estimation based on the other two methods indicates this number to be about 19 times (18.67 or 
18.79, according to the Pooled LS or GLS, respectively), other things king equal. 
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Table 3 
Home Bias, 1991-1997 
Model: 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Home,] 2.9267 2.7134 2.9335 2.7248 2.71 15 2.5067 
(0.1205) (0.121 1) (O. 1202) (O. 1206) (0.2402) (0.2354) 
Ln(Yi) 0.8478 0.9336 0.8474 0.9332 0.8742 0.9108 
(0.0093) (0.0124) (0.0092) (0.0123) (0.0163) (0.0233) 
L n 0 9  0.7267 0.6905 0,7267 0.6888 0.7484 0.6907 
(0.0086) (0.0124) (0.0086) (0.0123) (0.0184) (0.0242) 
Lln(Dij) -1 .O282 -0.9043 -1 .O271 -0.9038 -1.1741 -1 .O023 
(0.0168) (0.0205) (0.0167) (0.0204) (0.0390) (0.0551) 
Ln(?? Wi) 0.7580 0.7654 0.3732 
(0.0689) (0.0685) (O. 1799) 
Ln(li@9 -0.5143 -0.5232 -0.6729 
(0.0862) (0.0857) (O. 1 794) 
L a n g q F y  0.0843 0.0752* 0.0790* 
(O. 0462) (0.0460) (0.1 117) 
Adjacency, 0.6487 0.6504 0.8035 
(0.0542) (0.0539) (O. 1546) 
# Obs. 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 
~ d j  . R~ 0.8785 0.8869 0.8790 0.8876 0.8753 0.8832 
S.E.of regression 0.993 1 0.9579 0.993 1 0.9579 1 .O060 0.9734 
Estimation method YOLS POLS GLS GLS SUR SUR 
d 
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; 
(2) * indicates a coe*cient that is NOT stalisticaily significant at the 10% lwel; 
(3) Year-specific intefcepts are included in aiî regressions but not reported here. 
Those figures are comparable in size with the results that McCallum (1995) and 
Van Wincoop (2003) found to the provinces of Canada. However, when compared with 
Wei (1996) and Nitsch (2000), whose methodology are similar to ours (and, therefore, the 
comparison is more pertinent), results indicate a higher degree of home bias. Perhaps, one 
explanation for these findings relies on the fact that our sample includes many developing 
countries, not as integrated as North-American, European or OECD countries, which 
were the basis for those studies. 
For the extended Model 2, Table 3 shows the results in columns 3, 5 and 7. For 
the three methods of estimation, we can conclude that almost al1 the coefficients have the L correct sign and are statistically significant at the 10% level. The exceptions are the 
coefficient of remoteness for the importing country [ln(ZiWJ], which is statistically 
significant but does not have the expected sign, and the coefficient of the language 
dummy, which is not statistically significant at the 10% level when we used GLS and 
SUR estimation (although it shows the expected signs). 
It should be notice4 that the results do not change qualitatively with the extension 
from equation (1) to equation (2). Quantitatively, however, the home bias effect tends to 
be reduced with the inclusion of al1 the other control variables (remoteness, language and 
common border). For example, analyzing the results shown at column 7, corresponding to 
the SUR method applied to Model 2, the effect of the border on the trade arnong the 
countries is 2.5067 (against 2.71 15, for Model 1). That is, other things being equal, on 
average, a country trades 12.26 (= exp [2.5067]) times more with itself then with another 
country in the sample. This reduction in the home bias when the controls are included 
suggest that part of the home bias effects captured in the estimated equation (1) is, in fact, 
due to other factors, which are omitted in the simplest Gravity Model equation. 
Regarding the control variables added to Model 1, with the exception of the 
remoteness effect for the importing country (whose signs were "wrong") the results were 
the expected. For example, according to estimation of Model 2 by the SUR method, the 
rise by one percent on the average distance (remoteness) of the exporting country would 
increase its exports to another country by 0.37 percent. The results also show us that 
those countries that speak the same language do not tend to trade more between them in 
comparison with another country that speaks a different language (notice that the 
estimated elasticity is 8.22% = exp [0.0790] - 1, but the coefficient is not significant). On 
the other hand, sharing a çommon border has a great influence on the trade between two 
countries: countries in the sample tend to export 123.33% (= exp [0.8035] - 1)17 more to 
1 7  Wei (1996, p. 11) found that couniries speakuig the same language tend to trade 80% more and for 
those that share the land tend to trade 30% more than otherwise. 
a country with which it shares a common border than to a country that is geographically 
b more distant. 
Table 4 
Evolution of the Home Bias 
Home, 
Zn(Yi) 
zn(rjl 
Zn(Dij) 
In@ Wo 
Zn@W 
Language, 
Adjacen~y~ 
# Obs. 
Adj. R~ 
S.E. of regression 
1991 , 1992 
2,901 5 2,8629 
(0,3 197) (0,3225) 
0,9120 0,9503 
(0,0307) (0,0323) 
0,6770 0,6638 
(0,0314) (0,0316) 
-0,8912 -0,9180 
(0,0536) (0,0550) 
0,8778 1,0105 
(O, 1685) (O, 1793) 
-0,7128 -0,6776 
(0,2225) (0,2259) 
-0,0089* -0,0295* 
(O, 1209) (O, 1 198) 
0,6682 0,6254 
(0,1419) (0,1370) 
472 476 
0,8944 0,8930 
0,9305 0,9434 
1993 
2,8324 
(0,3117) 
0,9356 
(O,O3 16) 
0,65 1 1 
(0,03 11) 
-0,8901 
(0,0522) 
0,8600 
(O, 1845) 
-0,6220 
(0,2 197) 
-0,0263 * 
(0,1187) 
0,7097 
(O,, 13 54) 
476 
0,8937 
0,9233 
1994 
2,7540 
(0,3216) 
0,9191 
(0,0330) 
0,6927 
(0,0324) 
-0,9077 
(0,0543) 
0,671 8 
(O, 1843) 
-0,5082 
(0,2332) 
-0,0578* 
(O, 1 23 2) 
0,708 1 
(O, 1498) 
475 
0,8887 
O,% 15 
2,6692 
(0,3255) 
0,9374 
(0,0329) 
O, 7048 
(0,0326) 
-0,8947 
(0,054 1) 
0,6408 
(O, 1826) 
-0,4058 
(0,2229) 
O, 1458~ 
(O, 1244) 
0,6133 
(O, 1482) 
478 
0,8906 
0,9361 
2,5030 
(0,3333) 
0,9434 
(0,0347) 
0,7257 
(0,0352) 
-0,9256 
(0,0571) 
0,5834 
(O, 1824) 
-0,2679* 
(0,2338) 
0,3394 
(O, 1270) 
O,% 18 
(0,1515) 
473 
0,8739 
1,0050 
2,4603 
(0,3267) 
0,943 5 
(O,O3 58) 
0,7217 
(0,0362) 
-0,9050 
(0,0566) 
0,6320 
(0,2029) 
-0,3888* 
(0,2442) 
O,24 17 
(O, 123 3) 
0,6587 
(O, 1473) 
477 
0,8655 
1,0358 
Estimation method LS LS LS LS LS LS LS 
(2) * indicates a coefficient thai is N(YT statisticaily signincant at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specific intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reported here. 
The second exercise we implemented intended to capture the behavior of the 
home bias over time. For that purpose, following Nitsch (2000), we estimated seven 
separated Least Squares (LS) regressions of equation (2), one equation for each year in 
the sample. The results are shown in Table 4, above. Again, al1 the coefficients show the 
expected sign and are highly significant, with the exceptions of the coefficients for the 
b remoteness effect of the importing country and those for the variable ~ a n ~ u a ~ e . ' ~  
In particular, the coefficient of the home bias behaved as expected in a context of 
increasing trade liberalization and integration. Following Wei (1996), an increase in the 
integration among the countries in the sample should be reflected in a decrease on the 
home bias over time. Wei (1996) found evidence of this decreasing trend in the home 
bias, for the OECD countries, and Nitsch (2000) got similar results for the European 
countries. 
This decreasing in the degree of home bias seems to happen for the 22 countries 
in our sample, too. To see this, in comparison to the results for the whole sample 
(reported in Table 3), let us consider the Figure 1. Notice that the degree of home bias has 
decreased continuously from 1991 to 1997. Using the same interpretation as Wei and 
Nitsch, we see this result as evidence that the trade liberalization process has come to the 
22 countries in the sample. 
Figure 1 
1 Evolution of the Home Biss, 1991-1997 
10 C r--- -- I- -------- 
1991 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 194' 
? ears 
lol.IIoiiie Bias car-b! - y a r  - *--- 199 1 - 19")-Pooled L 5 
-- 
91-199'-51 
- - 
Note: the lines correspond to the average home bias for the 1991-1997 period, according to the 
three estimation methods used. 
18 The coefficients of the importing counîry's remoteness effect do not have the expected signs. but 
L are signincant for the years 1991 to 1995; those for the variable Language also do not have the expected signs for the years 1991 to 1994, but are not statistically significant for the years 199 1 to 1995. However. for the years 1996 and 1997, the coefficients on Language are positive and signincant. 
Table 5 
L Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias, 1991-1997 
Model: 3 4 3 4 3 4 
Merc, 0,3288 0,0056* 0,3243 -0,0055* 0,3299. 0,0950* 
Intra, 
Other, 
Zn(Yi) 
wu 
Zn@# 
Zn@ Wi) 
Zn@W 
Language, 
Adjacencyij 
(0,0968) 
2,9483 
(0,2 188) 
2,6785 
(O, 1349) 
0,9327 
(0,0123) 
0,6883 
(0,O 124) 
-0,8985 
(0,02 15) 
0,7468 
(0,0724) 
-O,M 19 
(0,0924) 
0,0833 
(0,0471) 
0,661 5 
(0,2758) (0,293 1) 
2,6139 2,8146 
(0,5304) (0,508 1) 
2,7256 2,4482 
(0,2588) (0,2566) 
0,8753 0,9092 
(0,0163) (0,0234) 
0,7494 0,6894 
(0,0184) (0,0243) 
- 1,1596 -0,9890 
(0,0407) (0,058 1) 
0,3303 
(0,1887) 
-0,7163 
(O, 1884) 
O, l006* 
(O, 1 152) 
0,8094 
(0,0554) (0,055 1) (O, 1573) 
# Obs. 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 
Adj. R' 0,8787 0,8869 0,8792 0,8876 0,8756 0,8832 
S.E. of regression 0,9920 0,9580 0,9920 0,9580 1,0049 0,9734 
Estimation method POLS POLS GLS GLS SUR SUR 
i 
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; 
(2) * indicates a coefficient that is NOT statisticaliy significant at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specific intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reported here. 
The Table 5 shows the results of a third experiment. Here, we divided effect of the 
dummy variable Home into three different dummies. The fust dummy, named Merc, 
takes the value of 1 when both countries i and j are Mercosur members (including i = j), 
and zero otherwise. It is supposed to measure the home bias for the Mercosur Bloc as a 
whole, relatively to the other countries in the sample. The 2nd dummy, Intraij, is equal to 
1 when i = j and both i a~ld j are Mercosur country-members, and zero otherwise. This 
L dummy gives us the degree of home bias within the Mercosur country-members. The last 
dummy (Other,,) takes the value of 1 when i = j and both i and j are non members of the 
L Mercosur, and zero othenvise, indicating the average home bias for non country- 
members. With those modifications, Models 1 and 2 become: 
For the Model 3 (see columns 2,4 and 6), on average, the Mercosur Bloc, seem as 
a whole, has a lower degree of home bias (the coefficient on Merc) in comparison both 
with the home bias observed for its country-members taken in separate (lntra) and with 
the home bias for the non-members (Other).lg Even when we included the other control 
variables (Model 4, in columns 3, 5 and 7) the home bias coefficient for the Mercosur 
Bloc, y,, continued to be low. For instance, considering the SUR estimation, the home 
bias for the Mercosur Bloc indicates that the Mercosur Bloc export to itself only 1.10 
times (= exp [0.0950]) more than it does to the others non-member countries. Not only 
low is the home bias coefficient, but not significant at the 10% level in al1 three 
estimation methods used. 
The coefficients on the Intra and Other dummies, however, are estimated (SUR 
method, Model 4) to be 2.8146 and 2.4482, respectively. This suggests that, other things 
being equal, the Mercosur country-members and non-Mercosur members trade 16.69 (= 
exp [2.8 1461) and 1 1.57 (= exp [2.4482]) times more with themselves than with another 
country, r e ~ ~ e c t i v e l ~ . ~ ~  We can interpret a low home bias for the Mercosur as a bloc, 
19 Notice that the estimated y, coefficient is men non-significant at the 100! level when we 
estimated by the SUR method. 
20 Notice that the remoteness coefficient for the importing country has not the expected sign, but it is 
signifiant. In addition, the coefficient on Language is not statistically signifiant when the SUR method of 
combined with high degrees of home bias for its country-members taken in separate and 
L for the non-members, as suggesting that the residents of the Mercosur bloc have not a 
revealed preference for Mercosur-produced goods (although they tend to prefer the goods 
produced in their own countries). 
Table 6 
Evolution of the Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias 
Merc, 
Intra, 
Other, 
In(Yii, 
Zn(Dij) 
In@ Wo 
ln@WJI 
Language, 
Adjacencyij 
-0,3081* 
(0,2495) 
3,3614 
(0,5603) 
2,7844 
(0,3575) 
0,9136 
(0,0307) 
0,6787 
(0,03 16) 
-0,9042 
(0,0562) 
0,9165 
(O, 1758) 
-0,6739 
(0,2399) 
-0,0248* 
(O, 1 240) 
0,6996 
-0,1119* 
(O,M 16) 
3,1487 
(0,5988) 
2,7964 
(O, 3 602) 
0,9506 
(0,0322) 
0,664 1 
(0,03 19) 
-0,9197 
(0,0583) 
1,0142 
(O, 1872) 
-0,6738 
(0,2449) 
-0,0308* 
(O, 1240) 
0,6426 
(0,2226) 
3,0772 
(0,5519) 
2,7756 
(O,35 14) 
0,9359 
(O, O3 1 6) 
0,6513 
(0,03 14) 
-0,8914 
(0,0561) 
0,8630 
(O, 1968) 
-O,6 190 
(O,B 99) 
-0,0273* 
(0,1219) 
0,7245 
(0,23 16) 
2,9647 
(0,5625) 
2,7121 
(O,3 646) 
O,9 182 
(0,0329) 
0,6918 
(0,0327) 
-0,9002 
(0,0587) 
0,6440 
(0,198 1) 
-0,5360 
(0,2565) 
-0,0465* 
(O, 1269) 
0,7180 
(0,2713) 
2,842 1 
(0,5913) 
2,6391 
(0,3658) 
0,9362 
(0,0328) 
0,7035 
(0,0328) 
-0,8828 
(0,0564) 
0,5996 
(O, 1943) 
-0,4472 
(0,2406) 
0,1639* 
(O, 1275) 
0,6193 
(0,295 1) 
2,571 1 
(0,6294) 
2,5028 
(O,3 709) 
O,94 17 
(0,0347) 
0,7239 
(0,0353) 
-0,9082 
(0,0586) 
0,5257 
(O, 1932) 
-0,3258* 
(0,2494) 
0,3642 
(O, 1290) 
O, 5492 
(0,2757) 
2,53 11 
(0,6029) 
2,4634 
(0,3643) 
O,94 16 
(0,0356) 
0,7198 
(0,0363) 
-0,8845 
(0,0589) 
0,5622 
(0,s 143) 
-0,4585 
(0,2596) 
0,2697 
(O, 1253) 
0,6537 
(O, 1459) (0,1393) (O, 1378) (O, 1534) (O, 15 18) (0,1546) (O, 1501) 
# Obs. 472 476 476 475 478 473 477 
Adj. R' 0,8943 0,8926 0,8933 0,8883 0,8902 0,8735 0,8652 
S.E. of regression 0,93 12 0,945 1 0,9250 0,9533 0,9378 1,0066 1,0373 
Estimation method LS LS LS LS LS LS LS 
Notes: (1) Standard emrs in parenthesis; 
(2) * indicates a coefficient that is NOT statistically signifiant at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specific intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reported here. 
estimation is used. The fact that language seems to plays no role on the trade flow among the 22 couniries 
on the sample was also verined in the previous experiment 
2 5 
Our final experiment is designed to capture the evolution of the Mercosur Bloc's 
(4 home bias vis-à-vis the home bias of the individual countries inside the Mercosur Bloc 
and the non-Mercosur members. In particular, we are interesteci in observing if the home 
bias of the Mercosur bloc, despite its low level (as we saw above), has a tendency to 
increase overtime. If this were true, we would have evidence that the creation of the bloc 
in 1990 has been effective in increasing the integration among its country-members. 
Again, following Nitsch (2000), we estimated seven separate LS regressions of 
Mode1 4, for each year in the sample period. Table 6 reports the results. Once again, the 
coefficients have the expected sign with the exceptions of the remoteness for the 
importing country and the Language dummy. 
We reproduce the results of Table 6 in Figures 2, 3 and 4. First, consider the 
Figure 2. Notice that, for every year in the sample, the degree of home bias is low (less 
than 1.4) for the Mercosur Bloc as a bloc. Most important result, however, is the fact that 
the degree of home bias has been increasing over the period, which suggests an increase 
in the relative preference of the bloc's residents for Mercosur-produced goods. 
Figure 2 
Mercosur: Home Bias Evolution, 1991-1997 
years 
*Hoiiic Bias year-by-yrar 1991-1997-Pooled LS 
-+m** 1991- 1997-Ci1 S - 199 1 - 1997-SI'R 
Notes: (1) The (*) next the Home Bias m e  indicates a coefficient that is not statistically significant at 
the 10% level: 
(2) The lines correspond to the average home bias for the 1991-1997 period, according to the three 
estimation methods used. 
In contrast, as shown at the Figure 3, the home bias for intra-Mercosur members 
L (that is, for the country-members taken individually) has decreased (fi-om almost 30 ta 
less than 13) over the same period, suggesting that the countries within the bloc are more 
open to trade with other countries in the sarnple. 
Figure 3 
Intrs-Mercosur Rlembers: Home Biss Evolution, 1991-1997 
. .,. .. ",. 
*Home Rias year-by-year 199 1 - 1997Pooled LS 
1991-1997-G1.S - 1991 - 1997-SIX 
Note: The lines correspond to the average home bias for the 1991-1997 periad, according to the three 
estimation methods used. 
Figure 4 
Kon-Mercosur Members: Home Bias Evolution, 1991-1997 
17 , 1 
vearri 
*Hoiiie Bias year-by-year 199 1-1997-Pooled LS 
--#. 1991-1997 GLS - 1991-1997 SCX 
I - - 
Note: The lines correspond to the average home bias for the 1991-1997 period, according to the three 
estimation methods used. 
Finally, Figure 4 shows the reduction of the home bias for the non-Mercosur 
LJ country-member in the sample, following the observed trade liberalization patterns for 
other regions. 
We interpret these findings as evidence: 
1) For an increasing integration inside the Mercosur bloc, as indicated by the 
increase of the home bias coefficient (that of the Merc dummy). If a higher integration 
among the countries inside the bloc was an objective when the creation of the bloc, our 
results support the conclusion that this goal has been achieved; 
2) For an improvemant in the trade liberalization process, both for the Mercosur 
country-members (taken individually, in their trade with the rest of the world, as 
indicated by the coefficients of the Intra durnmy) and for the non-members (the Other 
dummy), following what seems to be happening in other regions [as the studies of Wei 
(1996) and Nitsch (2000) show]. 
VI. Robustness Checks 
VI. 1 Collinearity Problems 
We recall the two dummy variables included in the Models 3 and 4: 
Merc, = 1 ,  if countries i and j are both members of the Mercosur 
= 0, otherwise 
Intra, = 1, if countries i and j are both members of the Mercosur AND i = j .  
= O, othenvise 
Notice that, the way they are defined implies that Inirai, = Merclj whenever one of 
the two following situations is verified: 
1) The countries i OR j are not a member of the Mercosur Bloc (in which case, 
In* = Merc, = O); 
2) The countries i AND j are BOTH members of the Mercosur AND i = j (in which 
case, In- = Merc, = 1). 
That is, whenever the Intra dummy takes the value of 1, so does the Merc dummy 
(although the inverse is not true); whenever the Merc dummy takes the value of O, so 
does the Intra dummy. Another way to put it is that al1 the information contained in the 
Inîra dummy is already included in the Merc dummy. This could raise a problem of 
multicollinearity. 
The multicollinearity usually occurs when the explanatory variables display high 
LJ intercorrelation, which seems to be the case here as we explained in the previous 
paragraph, although it is not well captured by a simple correlation coefficient (here, 
L because the observations of the two variables consist only of zeros and lys). When the 
multicollinearity problem is high enough, "it becomes difficult to disentangle the separate 
effects of each of the explanatory variables on the explained variable." 21 
In order to account for the possibility of multicollinearity, in this section we will 
do the same exercise as in the previous section, but we will divide the effects of the Home 
dummy on equations (1) and (2) in only two dummies (differently of the three dummies 
in the previous section). First, we are going to consider a case in which the Home dummy 
will be replaced only by the dummies Merc and Other (not Intra). By doing that, we are 
explicitly separating the effects of the two variables. Therefore, for the first exercise, the 
Models 3 and 4 become: 
Table 7 shows the results of the estimations of Models 5 and 6. Comparing to the 
results of the Table 5, and considering the estimation of the Model 6 by the SUR method, 
one can conclude that other things being equal, the home bias for the Mercosur Bloc is 
2.05 (= exp[0.7179]) against 1.10 (= exp[0,0950]), fiom Table 5. Despite the fact that this 
new estimation (without the Intra dummy) reveals a degree of home bias twice as higher 
than that shown in the Table 5 (when the Intra variable was included) it is also 
statistically significant, differently from then. Al1 the other coefficients are robust to this 
experiment . 
21 See Maddala (1992), p. 270. 
Table 7 
Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias II, 1991-1997 
Model: 5 6 5 6 5 6 
Merc, 
Other, 
Zn(Yi) 
w u )  
In(Dij) 
In@ Wi) 
~n(RWJ) 
Language, 
Adjacencyi, 
0,9427 0,6093 
(O, 1347) (O, 1478) 
2,8048 2,5280 
(0,1378) (0,1377) 
0,8513 0,9406 
(0,0096) (0,O 128) 
0,7301 0,6972 
(0,0088) (0,0129) 
-1,0550 -0,9594 
(0,0177) (0,0221) 
0,8078 
(0,0745) 
-0,4652 
(0,0943) 
O, 1041 
(0,0483) 
0,5892 
0,9412 0,6037 
(0,1347) (0,1477) 
2,8088 2,5349 
(O, 1376) (0, 1373) 
O,85 1 1 0,9404 
(0,0095) (0,0128) 
0,7300 0,6959 
(0,0088) (0,0129) 
-1,0544 -0,9598 
(0,O 176) (0,022 1) 
0,8156 
(0,0742) 
-0,470 1 
(0,0940) 
0,0958 
(0,0482) 
0,5908 
0,9133 
(0,2572) 
2,5982 
(0,2655) 
0,8768 
(O, O 1 66) 
O,75 12 
(0,0188) 
-1,1999 
(0,041 1) 
0,7179 
(0,2817) 
2,3 187 
(0,2649) 
O,9l 13 
(0,0239) 
0,6953 
(0,0249) 
-1,0424 
(0,0593) 
0,3382 
(O, 193 7) 
-0,6709 
(O, 1934) 
O, 1 O O ~ *  
(0,1188) 
0,7675 
(0,055 1) (0,0549) (0,1625) 
# Obs. 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 
Adj. R~ 0,8726 0,8805 0,8730 0,8810 0,8694 0,8764 
S.E. of regression 1,0167 0,9847 1,0167 0,9847 1,0296 1,00 13 
Estimation method POLS POLS GLS GLS SUR SUR 
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; 
(2) * indicates a coefficient that is NOT statistically signincant at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specific intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reporteci here. 
In order to evaluate the evolution of the Mercosur bloc's home bias, we repeated 
the series of seven LS regressions (one for each year in the sample), only this time we 
used the Model 6. The results from this experiment are reported in the Table A, in the 
Appendix and, below, in the Figures 5, we only show the evolution of the coefficients of 
the Merc dummy, which indicates the degree of home bias for the Mercosur as a bloc. 
Figure 5 
Mercosur: Home Bias Evollition II, 1991-1997 1 
yenrs 
- Home Bias year-by-year .--- - 1 99 1 - 1 997-Poolcd LS 
1991-1997 GLS - 1991-1997 SUR 
Note: the lines correspond to the average home bias for the 1991-1997 period. 
We also considered an experiment where the Home dummy was replaced only by 
the dummies Intra and Other (not Merc), both in the estimation for the whole period and 
for each year individually. Since the results did not change much in comparison to those 
shown in the Tables 5 and 6, we did not report they here. The reader can see them at the 
Tables B and C, in the Appendix .22 We display in the Figure 6, however, the evolution of 
the coefficients of the Intra dummy. 
Notice that, similarly to our conclusion based on Table 6 and Figures 2 and 3, we 
can also observe that the home bias for the Mercosur Bloc has been increasing over the 
period 1991 to 1997 and that the home bias for the other countries in the sample follows 
the reverse trend. There are two main differences of these results from those of Table 6. 
22 In this experiment, the Models 3 and 4 became, respectively: 
Model 5a: 
+ y21ntmij,t + y30theqj,t + Pl '(q,t)+ 82 ' (Y , , )+  83 '('ij,t )+ ' i j , t  
Model 6a: 
~ n ( x , ~ ) =  at + ~21ntra,t + y,Otheqj,t + Pl ' ( ~ ; , t ) +  82 h(~j,t)+ 8 3  ' ( ~ i j , t  )+ 
+ j?, In(RWi) + 8, '(RW,) + P,Language, + P,Adjacency, + E,,, 
First, the degree of home bias for the Mercosur Bloc is higher now. Second, fiom the year 
C/ 1995 on, the coefficient that measure the home bias is statistically significant, differently 
fiom the previous exercise (see Appendix, Table A). 
.- - . 
Figure 6 
. -- - .- -  -- 
Intra-Mercosur Members: Home Bias Evolution II, 1991-1997 
- -  
- I I  
vears 
-Home Bias year-by-year - 1991-1997 Pooled LS 
-..)ç- 1991-1997 - GLS - 199 1 - 1 997-SUR  
Note: the lines correspond to the average home bias for the 199 1-1997 period. 
Therefore, the evidence that the Mercosur residents have been showing an 
increasing preference for the bloc-produced goods is robust to this experiment. The same 
is true for the decreasing trend in the degree of home bias for the Mercosur country- 
members considered individually (not as a 
23 As for the non-member coutries, the evolution of the coefficient of the Other dummy can be seen 
both in Tables A and C, in the Appendix. The general trend of a decrease in their degree of home bias is 
observeci in both Tables. 
VI.2 Nitsch's Defiition of Remoteness 
One potential problem for the estimations we did so far is the measure of remoteness that 
we have been using. According to Nitsch (2000, p. 1093) the measure of remoteness used 
in the previous exercises [proposed by Wei (1996)l "in which both third-country GDP 
and bilateral distance enter with the same sign, is inconsistent with the theoretical 
requirements of the gravity approach." To check for robustness to the measure of 
remoteness, we are going to repeat some of the exercises above, this time using the 
measure of remoteness proposed by Nitsch, which is given by: 
where, RN, is the Nitsch-remoteness of country i, Y, is the GPD of country k and D,, is 
the distance between country i and k. 
Table 8 shows the results of the re-estimation of the Model 2 (that is, the simple 
Gravity Model extended by the remoteness effect, the Language and the Adjmcency 
dummies) and Table 9 shows the results for the re-estimation of Model 4 (the same as 
Model 2, but in which the effects of the Home dummy is divided into three different 
effects). The difference here is the use of the Nitsch-remoteness RN, instead of the Wei- 
remoteness, Ry . 
First, we estirnated the average home bias for al1 countries in the sample (that is, 
we used Model 2). By comparing the Table 8 with its analogous, the part of Table 3 
related to the Model 2, one could conclude that the results for the degree of home bias are 
robust when we use a different measure for remoteness. As before, the coefficients for the 
GDP's, distance and adjacency have the expected signs and are highly significant while 
the remoteness of the importing country has the "wrong" sign (and it is insignificant). 
C/ Once again, language seems to play no role on the trade flow. 
Table 8 
Home Bias II, 1991-1997 
Re-Estimation of Model 2 (Nitsch's Remoteness) 
Home, 2,6776 2,6860 2,6137 
(O, 1 197) (0,1192) (O,% 17) 
Ln09 0,9308 0,9305 0,8639 
(0,0129) (0,0128) (0,0277) 
Ln07 O, 723 3 O, 7226 0,6462 
(0,0137) (0,0137) (0,0287) 
WDIJ -0,9267 -0,9266 -0,9290 
(0,0194) (0,0193) (0,0588) 
WRW 0,2 175 0,2 190 -0,0263 * 
(0,0267) (0,0265) (0,07 17) 
ln (Iw. -0,04 13 * -0,0414* -0,3423 
(0,0334) (0,0332) (0,0697) 
Language, 0,0475* 0,0399* 0,1521* 
(0,0508) (0,0506) (O, 1 132) 
Adjacency, 0,6332 0,6338 0,8700 
(0,0520) (0,05 18) (O, 1539) 
# Obs. 3327 3327 3327 
Adj. R~ 0,8842 0,8848 0,8772 
S.E. of regression 0,9694 0,9694 0,998 1 
Estimation method POLS GLS SUR 
Notes: (1) Standard erron in menthesis: 
(2) * indicates a coefficient that i's NCYT statisticaiiy signincant at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specinc intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reported here. 
We also estimated (LS regressions) the Model 2 for each year of the sample. We 
show, in the Figure 7, only the estimated coefficients of the Home dummy over the seven 
regres~ions.~~ This should give an idea of the evolution of the effect that the border has on 
trade flows among the 22 countries in the sample. We observe that, in line with Our 
previous estimations (see Figure 1) and with other studies mentioned, the home bias 
24 The author, upon request, can provide the complete results of the estimations. 
shows a unequivocally trend to decrease, suggesting that the borders have been less and 
L less important to the trade flows. 
Figure 7 
S. 
1 Evolution of the Home Bias II, 1991-1997 
10.00 r - - r -  - r--- - - - -7 --1 - - 1 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
\ ean  
-0- Honie Bias year-by-year 199 1 - 1997-Pooled LS 
-** 199 L - 1997 GLS -1991-1997 SUR 
Note: the lines correspond to the average home bias for the 1991-1997 period. 
According with the results reported in Table 9, which are analogous to that in 
Table 5 (only the part related to the Model 4), once again we can conclude that the 
Mercosur bloc has a low degree of home bias, which is even not statistically significant. 
In order to verifjr the evolution of the home bias of the Mercosur as a bloc and for 
the Mercosur country-members, we estimated LS regressions of the Model 4 for each 
year of the sample. The estimated coefficients of the Merc and Intra dummies over the 
seven regressions are displayed in Figures 8 and 9, r e ~ ~ e c t i v e l ~ . ~ ~  Notice, fiom the Figure 
8, that the home bias for the Mercosur as a bloc is increasing over the sample period. In 
addition, the home bias for the Mercosur country-members (fiom Figure 9) follows the 
reverse trend. 
25 The author, upon request, can provide the complete results of the estimations. 
These results are, basically, the same we have found in Section V (compare 
L Figures 7, 8 and 9 with their corresponding, in Section V, Figures 1 ,2  and 3). One should 
conclude note that the estimation of the home bias using Nitsch's (2000) approach to 
define the remoteness effect does not change our previous results, based on Wei's (1996) 
remoteness measure. 
Table 9 
MercoGur Trade Bloc Home Bias III, 1991-1997 
Re-Estkmation of Mode1 4 (Nitsch's Remotenars) 
Merc, 0,0157* 0,0074* 0,0990* 
(O, 1329) 
0,9309 
(0,0128) 
0,7230 
(0,0136) 
-0,9224 
(0,0196) 
0,2161 
(0,0269) 
-0,0444* 
(0,0338) (0,0336) (0,0701) 
Languageij 0,0557* 0,0475* O, 1672* 
(0,052 1) (0,05 19) (O, 1 149) 
Adjacency , 0,63 72 0,6388 0,8636 
(0,0537) (0,053 5) (0,1583) 
# Obs. 3327 3327 3327 
Adj. R~ 0,8842 0,8848 0,8773 
S.E. of regressicrn 0,9694 0,9694 0,9979 
Estimation meth~d POLS GLS SUR 
Notes: (1) Standard brrors in parenthesis; 
(2) * indicates a coefficient that is NOT statistically signincant at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specific intercepts are included in al1 tegressions but not reported here. 
Figure 8 
Mercosiir: Home Bias Evolutioii III, 1991-1997 
T- i- ---r-. 1 
1991 1992 1995 1994 1995 1996 1997 
ears 
*IIoine Bias year-by-year #4*-- 1991-1997Pooled LS 
- 
- 
-*- 1991-1997-GLS 199 1- 1997-SUR 
- 
Note: the Iines correspond to the average home bias for the 1991-1997 period. 
Figure 9 
Intra-Mercosur Menibers: Home Bias Evolution III, 1991-1997 
100 / I 1 I 1 I I 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
yenrs 
*Home Bias yew-by-year 199 1 - 1997-Pooled 1.S 
+-- 1991-1997-CiLS - 1991 - 1997-SIX 
Note: the lines correspond to the average home bias for the 1991-1997 period. 
VI.3 Endogeneity Problem 
L 
The final robustness check we will pay attention refers to the problem of endogeneity of 
the GDP variable, that is, the potential correlation of this variable with the error term on 
our regressions. This econometric problem could occur because the level of exports, our 
dependent variable, might influence the level of the GDP (one of the regressors) by the 
accounting identity: exports are a component of the gross domestic production (GDP). 
Following the literature [Wei (1996) and Nitsch (2000)], we will use the 
population size as an instrument for the GDP and re-estimate Models 1 to 4 using the 
instrument variable (IV) method. The results are displayed in the Tables 10 (Models 1 
and 2) and 1 1 (Models 3 and 4).26 
Other things being equal, the average degree of home bias for the 22 countries on 
the sample, estimated by the instrumental method, is higher than that using the methods 
in the Section V, using the GDP variable. For example, comparing the results for the 
estimation of the Mode1 2 by the SUR method, the estimated home bias for the countries 
in the sample was (see Table 3), on average, 12.26 (= exp [2.5067]), while by the IV SUR 
method this value is 15.46 (= exp [2.7384]). 
We also remark that the coefficients on al1 other variables seem to corroborate, in 
general, the results shown in the Table 3. With the usual few exceptions (the remoteness 
effect of the importing country and the Lmguage dummy) they have al1 the expected sign 
and are highly significant. 
We now compare the outcomes on Table 5 with those on Table 11, which were 
obtained through regressions on the IV method. The general conclusion that the home 
bias of the Mercosur as a bloc (coefficient of the Merc dummy) is low and not 
L 26 Actuaily, we useci LN(POP) as an instrument for LNw.  
L statistically significant (roughly, the same results on Table 5) persists here," suggesting (again) that the residents of the Mercosur Bloc do not prefer the goods produced inside 
the bloc relatively to those! produced in the rest of the word. 
In addition, fiom the Table 11, we can see that the coefficients of the Intra and 
Other dummies are significant regardless the estimation method and of the same 
magnitudes as the estimated in Section V (see Table 5). This allows to maintain Our 
previous conclusion that the degree of home bias both in the Mercosur country-members 
and in the non-members are high in comparison to the home bias of the Mercosur as a 
bloc. 
Table 10 
Home Bias III, 1991-1997 
(Instrumental Variable) 
2.9256 
(O. 1 022) 
0.8610 
(0.01 18) 
0.7148 
(0.01 16) 
-1 .O287 
(0.0180) 
# Obs. 
2.7471 
(0.1016) 
0.9000 
(0.0164) 
0.6798 
(0.0161) 
-0.8972 
(0.0247) 
0.6149 
(0.0968) 
-0.5513 
(O. 0966) 
0.0471* 
(0.0528) 
0.6683 
(0.0685) 
3327 
2.7574 
(0.1010) 
0.9001 
(0.0163) 
0.6793 
(0.0160) 
-0.8969 
(O. 0245) 
0.6237 
(0.0964) 
-0.5556 
(0.0962) 
0.0393* 
(0.0525) 
0.6693 
(0.068 1) 
3327 
-1.1088 -0.9439 
(0.0404) (0.0560) 
0.4902 
(0.2172) 
-1.3845 
(O. 1970) 
-0.1 107* 
(O. 1188) 
0.8509 
(O. 1559) 
3327 3327 
Estimation method IV PLS IV PLS IV GLS IV GLS IV SUR IV SUR 
Notes: (1) Standard errors in pknthesis; 
(2) * indicates a coefficient that is NOT statistically significant at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specific intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reported here. 
27 The common exceptions (in Tables 5 and 11) are the coefficients of Merc for both the Pooled LS 
and GLS estimations of the MaPel3. 
Table 11 
Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias, 1991-1997 
(Instrumental Variable) 
0.3289 
(O. 1165) 
2.8505 
(0.2201) 
2.9476 
(O. 1 100) 
O. 8632 
(0.01 19) 
0.7171 
(0.01 16) 
-1.0123 
(0.0188) 
0.0370* 
(O. 1257) 
2.9621 
(0.2141) 
2.7040 
(O. 1 103) 
0.9000 
(0.0164) 
0.6798 
(0.0161) 
-0.8890 
(O. 0264) 
0.5893 
(0.1 024) 
-0.5774 
(O. 1 022) 
0.0610" 
(0.0539) 
0.6770 
0.3255 
(O, 1160) 
2.8617 
(0.2191) 
2.9526 
(O. 1095) 
0.8634 
(0.01 18) 
0.7173 
(0.01 16) 
-1.0115 
(0.0187) 
0.0248* 
(O. 1250) 
2.9800 
(0.2128) 
2.7120 
(O. 1097) 
0.900 1 
(0.0163) 
0.6792 
(0.0 160) 
-0.8895 
(0.0263) 
0.6003 
(0.1019) 
-0.5794 
(0.1017) 
0,0521" 
(0.0536) 
0.6789 
0.2536* 
(0.2769) 
2.7368 
(0.53 12) 
2.8778 
(0.2607) 
0.9035 
(O. 0242) 
0.6256 
(0.0221) 
-1.0981 
(0.041 8) 
(O. 0694) (O. 0690) (O. 1586) 
- 
# Obs. 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327- 3327 
Estimation method IV WS IVPLS IV GLS IV GLS IV SUR IV SUR 
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; 
(2) * indicates a coefficient that is NOT statistically signiIicant at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specinc intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reported here. 
VII. Home Bias as an Openness Index 
Wei (1996) suggests that the measure of home bias could also be used as an index of 
openness: 
"It provides an additional cross-country openness index that has certain 
m 28 advantages over other commonly used measures . 
That is, bigger a country's degree of home bias is, the more closed tends to be its 
economy to international tsade. By this association, one should conclude that if the home 
bias is decreasing over time, then countries are becoming more open to international 
trade, or more integrated. 29 
In line with this idea, we estimated specific home bias for each country on our 
sample. More specifically, we took the Model 2 (which is the simple Gravity Model 
extended to include the remoteness, the language and the common border effects) and 
divided the effect of the Home dummy into 22 country-specific dummies. The results of 
this estimation, for three different methods, are displayed at the Table 12, below. Notice 
that, considering the SUR estimation method, the country-specific coefficients of home 
bias are not significant for most of the developed countries in the sample (Italy is an 
exception). 
Figure 10 is a rank of openness, based on the country-specific home bias 
estimated by the SUR method. According to this rank, Belgium-Luxembourg (degree of 
home bias = 0.93 = exp [-0.07391) is the most open country in the sample, followed by 
France's home bias = 1.007 = exp [0.007]). They change ranks when we consider the 
other two estimation methods. On the other hand, Bolivia is the closest country, with a 
home bias of 126.76 (= exp E4.84231). The Bolivian rank does not change when we use 
the two other estimation methods. 
28 See Wei (1996, p. 17). 
29 See Wei (1996) pp. 19-20, where he examined the evolution of the home bias for the OECD 
countries. 
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Table 12 
Country-specific Average Home Bias, 1991-1997 
Argentina 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
France 
Germany 
Iran 
Italy 
Japan 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
U W ~ Y  
United State 
Venezuela 
l n 0  
ZnflJ 
Zn(D& 
Zn@ WJ 
Zn@ WJ 
Language, 
Adjacencyv 
# Obs. 
Adj. R~ 
S.E. of regression 
Estimation method POLS GLS SUR 
Notes: (1) * indicates a coefficient that is NOT statistically sigsitncant at the 10% level; 
(2) Year-specific intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reportexi hem. 
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Figure 10 
Country-Specific Average Home Bias, 1991-1997 
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Note: Gmphic based on the SUR estimation method 
From Table 12 and Figure 9, it is quite evident, that the degree of home bias 
observed for developing countries is higher in comparison to the developed countries. 
The only exception to this general rule is Argentins, whose degree of home bias is 
surprisingly smaller than Italy's and Spain's regardless of the estimation method used. If 
we interpret the home bias as an index of openness to international trade, these findings 
suggest that these developed countries are more open than the developing countries in the 
sample, which comes as no surprise. 
Regarding only the Mercosur country-members, the Argentins's border has, on 
C/ average, the smallest effect on trade, or in other words, it is the most open country among 
the Mercosur members, followed by Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay. 
VIII. Conclusion 
In this paper, we used the so-called "Gravity Model" to measure the degree of "home 
bias" among a sample of 22 countries, including South-American countries and the main 
trade partners of the Mercosur country-members. The results indicate that there is a 
substantial degree of home bias in the countries included in the sample. Furthermore, this 
measured home bias is decreasing over the period 1991-1997, suggesting an increase in 
the degree of integration of the goods markets, which is consistent with the ongoing 
worldwide trade liberalization process and has been documented in the literature. 
We also observed that the home bias for the Mercosur Bloc, treated as a single 
market, is low in comparison with the home bias for the whole sarnple of countries. The 
estimates of the Mercosur bloc's home bias go from 1.01 to 2.57 (considering our 
"reference model", which is the Model 4 estimated by the SUR method, the estimate is 
1.1). On the other hand, the home bias for the whole sample of countries it is roughly 
between 12 and 19 according to different models and methods (fiom Model 2 by the SUR 
method, Our corresponding "reference model" for the whole sample, it is 12.26). 
However, despite its low level, the Mercosur bloc's home bias is observed to be 
consistently increasing over time, suggesting that the creation of the bloc was effective in 
promoting the integration between the Mercosur national economies. These results are 
reinforced by the fact (see Figure 3) that, if we treat each Mercosur country-member 
individually, the home bias is consistently decreasing over the period of analysis, which 
suggests that the Mercosur country-members are following the path of general trade 
liberalization, 
These general conclusions are fairly confirmed in al1 models and methods that we 
used in this study, suggesting that the Gravity Model is roughly robust to changes in 
model specification, estimation method and/or in the definition of the variables used. 
Finally, if one interprets the degree of home bias as an index of openness to the 
LJ international trade in the sense that the lower it is, the more open is the economy, this 
study have provided some evidence, at least for the sample used, that the developed 
countries are more open to trade than the developing countries. 
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L APPENDIX 
Table A (Multicollinearity Problem 1) 
Evolution of the Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias, 1991-1997 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Merc 0,3806* 0,5357* 0,5399* 0,6395* 0,6833 0,7275 0,7636 
(O,4 176) 
Other 2,6191 
(0,3650) 
Z n 0  0,9224 
(0,0324) 
ww 0,6870 
(0,0334) 
Zn(Dij -0,9755 
(0,0602) 
(O, 3 942) 
2,6293 
(O,3 580) 
0,9434 
(0,033 1) 
0,6587 
(0,0329) 
-0,9547 
(0,0580) 
(0,3903) 
2,5703 
(0,3705) 
0,9258 
(O, O3 42) 
O, 6992 
(0,0341) 
-0,9614 
(0,0599) 
(O, 1827) (O, 19 17) (0,2023) (0,2026) (0,1990) (0,1968) (0,2 163) 
w w )  -0,5919 -0,5991 -0,5460 -0,4654 -0,3820* -0,2639* -0,3957* 
(0,2448) (0,2477) (0,2446) (0,2606) (0,2444) (0,25 16) (0,261 8) 
Language -O,O 127* -0,02 19* -O,O 168* -0,03 54* O, 1742* 0,3749 0,2804 
(O, 1279) (O, 1271) (O, 1252) (O, 1296) (O, 1296) (O, 1304) (O, 1265) 
A djacency 0,6182 0,5674 0,6519 0,6472 0,5522 0,4872 0,5937 
(0,1461) (0,1400) (0,1392) (0,1530) (0,1499) (0,1512) (0,1473) 
# Obs. 472 476 476 475 478 473 477 
Adj. R' 0,8859 0,8855 0,8862 0,8818 0,8843 0,8687 0,8605 
S.E. of regression 0,9672 0,9760 0,955 1 0,9804 0,9629 1,0258 1,0550 
Estimation method LS LS LS 
Notes: (1) Standard mrs in menthesis; 
(2j * indicates a coefficient that is NOT statistically signifiant at least at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specific intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reported here. 
Table B (Multicollinearity Problem II) 
Model: 5a 6a 5a 6a 5a 6a 
Intra 3.1064 2.9329 3.1149 2.9450 2.8847 2.8757 
(0.2105) (0.2129) (0.2099) (0.21 17) (0.4807) (0.4719) 
Other 2.8899 2.6684 2.8965 2.6796 2.6756 2.4300 
(O. 1352) (O. 1354) (O. 1349) (O. 1348) (0.2554) (0.2503) 
I n 0  0.8483 0.9331 0.8479 0.9327 0.8745 0.9099 
(0.0093) (0.0124) (0.0092) (0.0 123) (0.0 163) (0.0233) 
ln(YJ) 0.7273 0,6900 0.7272 0.6883 0.7487 0.6900 
(0.0086) (0.0124) (0.0086) (0.0123) (0.0184) (0.0242) 
ln(Dij) -1.0275 -0.8988 -1 .O263 -0.8982 -1.1734 -0.9942 
(0.0169) (0.021 1) (0.0168) (0.0210) (0.0390) (0.0558) 
In@ Wi) 0.7384 0.7457 0.3461 
(0.0695) (0.0691) (O. 1823) 
wm? -0.5341 -0.543 1 -0.7003 
(0.0876) (0.0870) (0.1818) 
Language O. 0929 0.0838 0.0927* 
(O. 0462) (O. 0460) (O. 1 127) 
Adjacency 0.6594 0.6612 0.8176 
(0.0550) (0.0547) (O. 1553) 
# Obs. 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 
Adj. R' 0.8785 0.8869 0.8790 0.8876 0.8753 0.8833 
S.E. of regression 0.9% 1 0.9578 0.993 1 0.9578 1 .O060 0.9732 
Estimation method POLS POLS GLS GLS SUR SUR 
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; 
. . 
(2) * indicates a coedcient that is NOT sîatistically signincant at least at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specific intercepts are included in al1 regressions but not reported here. 
Table C (Multicollinearity Problem II) 
Evolution of the Mercosur Trade Bloc Home Bias, 1991-1997 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Intra 3.1770 3.0814 3.0203 2.9813 2.8991 2.6902 2.6775 
(0.5348) (0.5809) (0.5406) (0.558 1) (0.5700) (0.6023) (0.5834) 
Other 2.8454 2.8183 2.7936 2.7069 2.6214 2.4646 2.4159 
(0.3595) (0.3606) (0.3509) (0.3618) (0.3643) (0.3696) (0.3623) 
Zn(Yi) 0.91 14 0.9498 0.9351 0.9184 0.9369 0.9430 0.9431 
(0.0307) (0.0323) (0.0316) (0.0330) (0.0329) (0.0347) (0.0358) 
wu 0.6764 0.6633 0.6505 0.6920 0.7042 0.7253 ' 0.7213 
(0.03 14) (0.03 16) (0.03 11) (0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0353) (0.0363) 
Zn(Dij) -0.8841 -0.9124 -0.8854 -0.9019 -0.8888 -0.9208 -0.8997 
(0.0551) (0.0561) (0.0536) (0.0560) (0.0557) (0.0588) (0.0584) 
ln@ Wi) 0.8543 0.9920 0.8424 0.6501 0.6195 0.5667 0.6127 
(O. 1695) (O. 1797) (O. 1861) (O. 1859) (O. 1847) (O. 1852) (0.2063) 
In(RWjl -0.7365 -0.6963 -0.6397 -0.5299 -0.4272 -0.2847* -0.4082* 
(0.2260) (0.2287) (0.2230) (0.2372) (0.2270) (0.2385) (0.2483) 
Language 0.0018* -0.0208* -0.0190* -0.0489* O. 1553* 0.3468 0.2497 
(O. 121 1) (O. 1198) (O. 1188) (O. 1233) (O. 1243) (O. 1268) (O. 1232) 
Adjacency 0.6817 0.6360 0.7190 0.7195 0.6248 0.5609 0.6689 
(0.1439) (0.1386) (0.1374) (0.1523) (0.1504) (0.1539) (0.1497) 
# Obs. 472 476 476 475 478 473 477 
Adj. R' 0.8943 0.8928 0.8935 0.8885 0.8905 0.8737 0.8653 
S.E. of regression 0.93 11 0.9442 0.9241 0.9523 0.9369 1 .O059 1 .O367 
Estimation method LS LS LS LS LS LS LS 
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; 
(2) * indicates a coefficient that is NOT statistically signficant at least at the 10% level; 
(3) Year-specinc intercepts are included in al l  repssions but not reported here. 
